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mAbstract
We estimate the effects of the vocational rehabilitation (VR) program run by the
Canada Pension Plan Disability Program using administrative data. Identification relies
on “selection on observed variables” plus careful comparison group selection and
institutional knowledge regarding sources of conditional variation in participation.
We employ several matching and weighting estimators and emphasize flexible
conditioning on variables suggested by theory, the institutional setup and the
literature. We find modest, and imprecisely estimated, impacts on employment
outcomes for men and larger, sometimes statistically significant, impacts for women.
A formal sensitivity analysis finds our results are quite robust to lingering selection
on unobserved variables.
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Recently, disability policy has placed an increased focus on the employment of persons
with disabilities as a way to generate cost savings via reduced benefit payments. In-
creasing the return-to-work of disability beneficiaries is particularly important because
of shifts in the characteristics of persons collecting disability benefits over the last sev-
eral decades. First, the share of younger persons on the disability rolls is increasing in
many countries (Bound and Burkhauser 1999). This demographic change makes it
more difficult for disability beneficiaries to use disability insurance as a bridge to retire-
ment benefits. Second, the nature of disabilities has shifted somewhat over the last sev-
eral decades. Specifically, disability beneficiaries in Canada and the U.S. increasingly
suffer from health problems such as musculoskeletal and soft tissue problems as well
as mental disorders that tend to be more chronic in nature, rather than health prob-
lems associated with higher mortality rates and shorter claim duration (Bound and
Burkhauser 1999; Campolieti 2002; Rupp and Scott 1998). These two changes in the
nature of the disabled population both increase the time horizon over which invest-
ments in the skills of the disabled can pay off and increase the fraction of the disabled
likely to see improvements in their medical conditions that would allow for a return to
the labor market.Campolieti et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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ciaries to the labor market. On the one hand, disability insurance programs can allow
disability beneficiaries to engage in work activities and not terminate their benefits as
long as they do not cross an earnings threshold. This sort of policy (referred to as bene-
fit offset in the U.S. and an earnings disregard in Canada) can allow disability benefi-
ciaries to earn some labor market income as well as test the waters to determine
whether they can work in a sustained fashion. These sorts of initiatives are often bun-
dled with trial work periods and automatic reinstatement options, where if an individ-
ual leaves the disability rolls but then determines they are unable to maintain their
employment because of their disability they can resume receiving a disability pension.
There is some evidence that such incentives can increase the employment of disability
beneficiaries (Campolieti and Riddell 2012; Kostøl and Mogstad 2013) as well as their
exit rates from the disability rolls (Kostøl and Mogstad 2013).
On the other hand, the disability insurance program can also use vocational rehabili-
tation (e.g., training that upgrades existing skills or provides new skills, often in com-
bination with job search assistance) as an alternative policy instrument to increase the
employability of disability insurance beneficiaries. While used extensively by workers’
compensation programs for many decades (Allingham and Hyatt 1995), these programs
are a relatively recent addition to disability insurance programs in many countries. For
example, the Canada Pension Plan disability (CPPD) program only introduced a voca-
tional rehabilitation program to facilitate the return-to-work of its beneficiaries in the
1990s, well after the CPPD program was created in the mid-1960s. The U.S. also ex-
panded the potential for vocational rehabilitation in its disability policy via the Ticket
to Work (TTW) initiative that provides disability beneficiaries with a voucher that can
be used to purchase public or private sector employment services (U.S. Social Security
Administration 2004).
Generally, most countries use a combination of these sorts of policies in their disabil-
ity strategies. Consequently, disentangling the impact of greater vocational rehabilitation
services from financial and other incentives to encourage employment can be somewhat
difficult because a client may have received vocational rehabilitation services and also
have a number of other incentives influencing his or her decision to return to the labor
market. Moreover, in some countries, like the United States, there is a complicated
structure of programs available to persons with disabilities and disability beneficiaries
that makes it difficult to design, test and implement initiatives (Wittenburg et al. 2013).
In contrast, Canada offers a unique opportunity to study the effects of vocational re-
habilitation on exit rates from the disability rolls as well as subsequent employment.
Canada’s disability insurance program, the Canada Pension Plan Disability (CPPD) pro-
gram, did not introduce its vocational rehabilitation program, the CPPD-VR program,
until the mid-1990s. Moreover, when it did introduce this program it did not have any
other incentives (e.g., allowable earnings, trial work periods, or automatic reinstatement
options for disability beneficiaries who left the disability rolls) available to disability
beneficiaries that might increase their employment. However, the CPPD program began
to change its strategy and approach for facilitating the attachment of its beneficiaries to
the labor market by beginning to introduce these incentives in 2001 (Campolieti and
Riddell 2012). Consequently, there is a short window available in the Canadian data
where only vocational rehabilitation services were available to disability beneficiaries.
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run by the Canada Pension Plan disability (CPPD) program on the labor market out-
comes of disability insurance beneficiaries. Our identification strategy relies on “selec-
tion on observed variables”, bolstered in our case by careful selection of the
comparison group and by the institutional knowledge that opportunities for partici-
pants in the CPPD VR program do not depend on local labor market conditions. We
use administrative data from the CPPD program and obtain our estimates with propen-
sity score matching estimators (kernel and local linear), an inverse probability weighting
procedure and a genetic matching estimator. Finally, we also provide some cost-benefit
computations from the perspective of the government.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows: Section 2 presents background infor-
mation on the CPPD program and its vocational rehabilitation program. Section 3 pro-
vides a detailed description of the data. Section 4 describes our treatment effect
estimators. Section 5 presents our principal empirical findings, a sensitivity analysis and
a comparison with previous research. Section 6 contains a calculation of the potential
savings in transfer payments for the CPPD program resulting from the CPPD-VR pro-
gram. We conclude the paper with a brief summary of our results and their implica-
tions for policymakers.
2. Background information and previous research
The Canada Pension Plan Disability (CPPD) program is the disability component of the
Canada Pension Plan (CPP), which was established in 1966. Quebec operates its own
program, the Quebec Pension Plan, which also contains a disability component. The
CPPD program is quite similar to the U.S. Social Security Administration’s Disability
Insurance (DI) program. The CPPD program is available to individuals with severe
(preventing the individual from working regularly) and prolonged (a long-term condi-
tion or condition likely to result in death) disabilities. In addition, applicants to the
CPPD program must also satisfy a contribution requirement, which functions as a
recency-of-work requirement (all workers in Canada must make contributions). In
other words, applicants must have worked in some of the years leading up to an appli-
cation for disability benefits.
The CPPD program does not place any conditions on eligibility related to the source
of the disability. This differs from workers’ compensation programs, which focus on the
compensation of disabilities arising in the course of employment. Benefits are paid until
the maximum age of 65, at which point disability pensions are converted into retire-
ment pensions. The CPPD program reevaluates or reassesses beneficiaries from time-
to-time. If this reassessment indicates that an individual no longer has a disability, as
defined by the CPPD program, then disability benefits would be terminated as a
consequence.
The Canada Pension Plan Disability program Vocational Rehabilitation (CPPD-VR)
program was established in 1997 as a successor to the National Vocational Rehabilita-
tion program, which evolved from a pilot program that operated from 1992–1997. The
goal of VR under CPPD is to facilitate the client’s return to gainful employment and
generate cost savings to the CPPD fund. The program is administered by Social Devel-
opment Canada and was delivered to clients by about 30 case managers in the 1990s.
These case managers screen CPPD beneficiaries for their suitability for vocational
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with the client the case managers develop an individualized plan, which can include a
vocational reassessment and planning, skills development and job search assistance.
Third-party contractors provide the services and in some cases may also have input
into the design of the client’s vocational rehabilitation plan.
While the CPPD-VR program is relatively new, VR has been used by other disability
programs much more extensively. For example, workers’ compensation programs (espe-
cially in Canada) often have a strong emphasis on VR in their rehabilitation strategies
(Allingham and Hyatt 1995). A number of studies have looked at the effects of VR pro-
vided by workers’ compensation programs (primarily) and other programs on the labor
market outcomes of individuals using data from the United States as well as Canada (e.g.,
among others, Dean and Dolan 1991a, b; U.S. General Accounting Office 1987, 1994;
Gardner 1988; Skaburskis and Collignon 1991; Allingham and Hyatt 1995; Campolieti
and Hyatt 2011; Dean et al. 2013a, b). This previous literature has produced a large range
of estimates, e.g., some studies indicate that VR is quite effective in improving labor mar-
ket outcomes, while others find that VR had little or no effect on the labor market out-
comes of program participants. However, the interpretation of these findings is
complicated by the differences in programs, which may also have different mandates and
strategies for rehabilitation, across studies as well as the subject populations (e.g., disability
insurance or worker’s compensation recipients versus persons with disabilities who do not
collect disability benefits). Another potential concern in many of these earlier studies is
that there may be identification problems since many were primarily descriptive (e.g., U.S.
General Accounting Office 1987, 1994; Gardner 1988; Skaburskis and Collignon 1991) or
utilized bivariate normal selection models or selection models using other distributional
assumptions with no (or questionable) exclusion restrictions (Allingham and Hyatt 1995;
Campolieti and Hyatt 2011). These identification problems may create biased estimates of
the impact of VR on employment outcomes that make it more difficult to make conclu-
sive statements about the effectiveness of VR initiatives, especially when combined with
differences in programs and study populations.
Wittenburg et al. (2013) review the results from a number of evaluations of demon-
stration and employment programs for disability beneficiaries and persons with disabil-
ities in the United States, which include the Ticket to Work as well as earlier programs
that provided vocational rehabilitation and other supports to various populations of
persons with disabilities. They focus on studies using (in their view) rigorous evaluation
methods (i.e., primarily relatively compelling non-experimental research designs along
with some experiments) so as to minimize identification problems in the interpretation
of estimates. At the same time, they consider a broad range of studies and interven-
tions, some of which involve only counseling and case management while others in-
clude training. In addition, the programs they consider serve a broad range of study
populations and groups. Overall, they did not find that there was much evidence of an
effect of these interventions on program participants. However, their review also sug-
gests that interventions targeted at some subpopulations, e.g., younger persons and per-
sons with mental health impairments, are more successful. However, as we noted
earlier, they also highlight the difficulties associated with evaluating specific programs
in the context of a highly complicated institutional thicket involving multiple agencies
and numerous programs and policies.
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ture on VR programs that addresses many of the problems in the earlier studies (see
also the more structural Dean et al. (2013a, b) papers). Their identification strategy
builds on the assumption that the availability of training slots in the VR program is not
correlated with economic conditions in a program participant’s home district. Aakvik
et al. (2005) study the VR program in Norway, which pays income support as well as
providing training programs to individuals who are unable to return to work after
52 weeks on sickness benefits. Their findings suggest that women who received VR
have higher employment rates than those who did not receive training, but their esti-
mates are not very precise. They also conclude that the gains in employment for pro-
gram participants would be increased if the least employable were encouraged to
participate in the program rather than using the existing selection rule that encouraged
persons who are deemed to have good employment prospects, i.e., cream-skimming, to
participate in the program.
3. Data
The data used in this analysis come from the administrative records of the Canada Pen-
sion Plan Disability program. The data were drawn from the following files: 1) Master
Benefits File (MBF), which includes information on CPPD beneficiaries, such as indi-
vidual characteristics; 2) Rules Based Reassessment System (RBRS) or reassessment file,
which includes information on beneficiaries identified for reassessment, beneficiaries
who have been reassessed and those who reported a return to work; 3) Rehabilitation
Case Management System (RCMS), which includes a wide range of information on
each individual (demographics, type of disability, etc.) who was enrolled in the CPPD-
VR program; and, 4) Record of Employment Master File (ROEMF), which contains an-
nual information on total income, labor market earnings and contributions to the CPP
program from 1990 until 2001. We excluded people who died or turned 65 during the
years we focus on since they are no longer eligible for CPPD.
The treatment group in our analysis is defined as the cohort of individuals who
started the CPPD-VR program during 1998. Some of the individuals in this cohort
dropped out of the program and so failed to complete their VR assignments. As we de-
fine treatment as starting VR, these individuals remain in our treatment group. We
track the post-VR experiences for the treatment group up until 2001. As we discussed
earlier, the CPPD program began introducing greater incentives to encourage return to
work during and after 2001. Campolieti and Riddell (2012) found that these initiatives
were associated with an increase in the employment of disability beneficiaries. Conse-
quently, including data after 2001 would make it difficult to distinguish the effect of VR
from these new initiatives. However, we do have a window, i.e., 1998 to 2001, to esti-
mate impacts of the CPPD-VR program that are not contaminated by any other policy.
Prior to 1997, VR was offered through the National Vocational Rehabilitation program.
The CPPD-VR replaced this program in 1997, but was still ramping up from the previ-
ous program. We focus on the 1998 cohort because potential VR clients and case man-
agers would have become more accustomed to the new program structure by 1998,
relative to clients and case managers in 1997.
As noted in Dean et al. (2013a, b), one could make a distinction between the short-
(up to eight quarters after treatment) and long-run (more than eight quarters after
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years) means that we consider only the short-run effects of the CPPD-VR program.
Viewed as proxies for the long-run estimates that we would prefer to have, our esti-
mates may embody a downward bias if the VR treatment itself takes a long time, and/
or if treated individuals who return to employment only slowly find their footing in the
labor market. We can rule out the first of these concerns because the VR program we
consider provides services in a concentrated, contiguous block, rather than spreading
them out over time as in Dean et al. (2013a, b).
We draw our comparison group from the reassessment file (RBRS) and include indi-
viduals who entered the reassessment file in 1998. Individuals are reassessed in the
CPPD if they are believed to have a high probability of returning to work. Individuals
in the reassessment file fit into two broad classifications. The first type of reassessment
includes those who had been flagged during their initial application for CPPD benefits
as being likely to regain their earnings capacity and be able to return to work (i.e., those
initially flagged for reassessment). The second type of reassessment includes persons
who are reassessed because of their earnings (i.e., reassessed because of earnings). The
CPPD program monitors its beneficiaries for earnings and for contributions to Canada’s
unemployment insurance program (called “Employment Insurance”, or EI) through in-
formation sharing agreements with the EI program and with Revenue Canada (the
government tax agency). Those who are deemed to have earnings or made EI contribu-
tions, based on information in these administrative sources, are reassessed. About 46
percent of the individuals in our comparison group got flagged for reassessment at the
time of initial application while the remainder were reassessed due to their earnings.
We focus on 1998 in order to temporally align the treatment and comparison groups.
Temporal alignment ensures that treated and untreated individuals face the same gen-
eral economic conditions and similar program environments. As individuals in the
RBRS database have either returned to work, been reassessed for their potential to re-
turn to work or are being reassessed for their potential to return to work, we view them
as more comparable to the VR treatment group than other CPPD beneficiaries. We
think this substantially reduces the selection problem facing our “selection on observed
variables” identification strategy; to the extent that selection bias remains after our con-
ditioning, we expect our comparison group to look “too good” and so bias our esti-
mated treatment effects downward. Like the treatment group, we only track our
comparison group through 2001.
Dean and Dolan (1991a, b) argue that the preferred comparison group in an evalu-
ation of a VR program consists of clients who enroll in VR services but drop out prior
to completion. They argue that using dropouts reduces concerns about selection bias
because dropouts and completers share the motivation to apply for the VR program,
satisfy the relevant eligibility criteria, and likely have similar levels of (unobserved) se-
verity in their disabilities. We understand their reasoning, but note three concerns with
this strategy in our context, one practical and two conceptual. At a practical level, we
simply do not have enough dropouts to have sufficient statistical power to detect effects
of reasonable size. More conceptually, using dropouts changes the nature of the esti-
mand from the effect of starting VR to the effect of finishing VR. These differ to the ex-
tent that partial receipt of VR affects outcomes. In addition, using dropouts may
accentuate some selection problems (why do the dropouts drop out?) while at the same
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tempt VR for reasons unrelated to their potential outcomes.
The administrative records contain extensive information on CPP disability insurance
recipients. This includes: the age at the onset of the disability, gender, pre-disability
educational attainment, province of residence, earnings before entering the disability
rolls, earnings after leaving the disability rolls (if they exited), and principal health prob-
lem (derived from ICD9 codes). For persons enrolled in VR we also have the total cost
of the services provided to these individuals.
We examine the effect of VR on several outcome measures. First, we consider the ef-
fect of VR on exit from the disability rolls during the period covered by our data. This
indicator takes the value one if the individual left the disability rolls (i.e., stopped re-
ceiving CPP disability benefits). While we would worry about a “leaving the rolls” out-
come in the context of other programs with frequent turnover, such as social assistance
in Canada or food stamps in the US, individuals who exit the CPPD rolls rarely return,
particularly in the short run.
Second, we also consider employment-related outcomes based on two definitions of
employment. The first simply captures any employment at any time during the period
covered by our data, with no restrictions on the level of earnings. The second measure
is defined as substantial gainful employment (SGO), where the individual must have
earnings above a certain threshold in one of the calendar years covered by our data1. In
both cases we code employment based on information in the ROEMF, which contains
total calendar year labor market earnings as reported on the T4 tax form2. We use
these definitions to define indicator variables corresponding to our two measures of
employment.
4. Methodology
4.1 Estimating the treatment effect
Following the standard notation, let Y1 denote the outcome for someone who receives
the treatment and Y0 the outcome for someone who does not receive the treatment. Y1
and Y0 are potential outcomes because we only observe one for each individual. Let
T = 1 indicate whether the person received the treatment, i.e., they received some VR,
while T = 0 denotes that the individual is in the comparison group. The average treat-
ment effect on the treated (ATET) in the population equals E[Y1 − Y0 | T = 1] = E[Y1 |
T = 1]−E[Y0 | T = 1]. We estimate this treatment effect using two propensity score
matching estimators, a reweighting estimator based on the estimated propensity score
and a genetic matching estimator.
We adopt a “selection on observed variables” strategy (Heckman and Robb 1985) to
identify the ATET. This approach requires the conditional independence assumption
(CIA), i.e., conditional on a set of observed covariates the untreated outcome is inde-
pendent of participation in the VR program, which is expressed mathematically as Y0 ⊥
T | X. Note that we need assume conditional independence only for the untreated out-
come due to our interest in the ATET; as such, we need not rule out selection into
treatment based on the treated outcome. The propensity score is the conditional prob-
ability of participating or receiving the treatment, i.e., P(X) = Pr[T = 1 | X]. We also re-
quire overlap or common support in P(X). We assume this holds in the population and
then restrict the analysis so it holds in the sample as well. Matching and reweighting
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use economic theory, institutional considerations and a review of previous empirical research
to determine the variables or factors that affect participation in VR and the labor market out-
comes we consider for our study population, i.e., persons with disabilities who are collecting
disability benefits. Our discussion provides a justification for the variables we include in our
specification of the propensity score. In some cases, our data do not contain direct measures
of these factors; in these cases we attempt to justify the proxies we use in their stead.
Following e.g. Smith and Todd (2005), estimating the ATET requires an estimate of
the counterfactual E [Y0 | T = 1]. Matching estimators estimate the counterfactual using
some estimator of the form
E^
h







P^ Xið Þ; P^ Xj
 
Y 0j; ð1Þ
where P^ Xið Þ is the estimated propensity score for individual i in the treated group, P^ Xj
 
is the estimated propensity score for individual j in the comparison group, j indexes all
the individuals in the comparison group, and w(•, •) is a weighting function based on the
distance between propensity scores for individual i and the individuals in the comparison
group. The form of the weights depends on (one might even say defines) the particular
matching estimator used.
We use three matching estimators - kernel matching, local linear matching and gen-
etic matching, along with Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW). Using multiple estima-
tors with different strengths and weaknesses but all based on the same identifying
assumption of “selection on observed variables” provides a clear indication of the sensi-
tivity of the empirical findings to details of the estimation strategy.
Local linear and kernel matching estimators are special cases of the general class of
estimators that uses local polynomial regression to estimate the (conditional) expected
value of the counterfactual outcome (Heckman et al. 1997). Both the kernel and local
linear matching methods take locally weighted averages of the observations in the non-
treated group to construct the counterfactual. For example, the kernel estimator
computes the weights in equation (1) as
w

P^ Xið Þ; P^ Xj
  ¼
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where G (•) is a kernel function, P^ •ð Þ is the estimated propensity score, and aN is a
bandwidth. The literature suggests that the choice of kernel does not matter much in
practice; we use the Epanechnikov kernel. In contrast, the literature clearly indicates
that bandwidth selection does matter; we selected our bandwidths using leave-one-out
cross-validation as in Black and Smith (2004). We present the bandwidths we use in
the kernel and local linear matching approaches in Table 1.
As noted in e.g. Todd (2008), local linear matching has some advantages over stand-
ard kernel matching. In particular, the local linear approach has a faster rate of conver-
gence near boundary points, which is important when the data feature many
propensity scores near zero or one (which is not the case in our application). More
Table 1 Bandwidths used for kernel and local linear matching estimators
Men Women
Kernel Local linear Kernel Local linear
Sample restricted to propensity score
values [0.001, 0.40]
Sample restricted to propensity score
values [0.001, 0.35]
Leaving disability rolls 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.07
Gainful employment 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.08
Substantial gainful employment 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.07
Sample restricted to propensity score
values [0.001, 0.35]
Sample restricted to propensity score
values [0.001, 0.30]
Leaving disability rolls 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.06
Gainful employment 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.07
Substantial gainful employment 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07
Sample restricted to propensity score
values [0.001,0.50]
Sample restricted to propensity score
values [0.001, 0.40]
Leaving disability rolls 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.07
Gainful employment 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.08
Substantial gainful employment 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.07
Note: We use an Epanechnikov kernel and select the bandwidth using leave-one-out cross validation.
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timates when the untreated outcome varies strongly with the estimated propensity
score (and when, as one would expect, the treatment and control observations have dif-
ferent propensity score distributions). The cost of the local linear estimator is the de-
gree of freedom lost to estimating a slope coefficient in addition to an intercept in each
local regression. We used the STATA ado file (psmatch2) developed by Leuven and
Sianesi (2003) for the kernel and local linear matching estimators.
As discussed in e.g. Busso et al. (2013), IPW reweights the comparison observations
using the estimated propensity score to implicitly create a comparison sample with the
same distribution of observed characteristics as the treatment group. IPW has two im-
portant advantages relative to the other estimators we employ: First, it just reweights
the data using the (estimated) propensity score and so does not require the (often
tiresome and sometimes problematic) choice of a bandwidth. Second, under certain
assumptions, the inverse probability weighting estimator achieves the semi-parametric
efficiency bound derived by Hahn (1998).
We check for covariate balance using the approach in Dehejia and Wahba (1999) as
implemented in Becker and Ichino (2002); see Lee (2013) for a recent overview on bal-
ancing tests. This process involves manually specifying and checking the propensity
score to ensure balance. While our final specification achieves balance, getting to that
specification required a series of modifications to the model until balance was achieved
(i.e., adding some higher order polynomials and interaction terms). We used the esti-
mated propensity scores from the resulting model for the kernel and local linear
matching estimators and for IPW.
The Genetic Matching (Genmatch) algorithm of Diamond and Sekhon (2013) pro-
vides an alternative path to covariate balance. This approach uses an evolutionary
search algorithm (i.e. a genetic algorithm) that chooses a weighting matrix W that max-
imizes the balance of the observed covariates across the treatment and comparison
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In (3), S is the covariance matrix of X, and S−
1
2 is the Cholesky decomposition of S.We follow Diamond and Sekhon (2013) and include in X the variables in our final pro-
pensity score model along with the estimated scores. We obtain our genetic matching
estimates and related statistics using the R package Matching developed by Sekhon
(2011).
We present separate estimates for men and women because there can be differences
in the labor market attachment of males and females as well as the type of work they
do. These differences are confirmed by a likelihood ratio test which rejects the null hy-
pothesis that the parameters of the propensity score model for males and females are
the same (likelihood ratio test statistic of 52 with a p-value of 0.003). The standard er-
rors on the ATET for our kernel matching, local linear matching and inverse probabil-
ity weighting estimators are all computed by bootstrapping.
4.2 The propensity score specification
Our specification of the propensity score includes a variety of different variables. We
group these variables as individual characteristics, health information, institutional in-
formation and economic variables. Our rationale for including these variables in the
propensity score model draws on economic theory, previous empirical research and in-
stitutional knowledge.
Our controls for individual characteristics include age at the onset of the disability,
marital status at time of application, an indicator for children, and educational attain-
ment. Public health researchers have found a strong association between age and dis-
ability and the recovery from functional limitations caused by disabilities (e.g. Beckett
et al. 1996; Anderson et al. 1998) and this could influence the degree to which individ-
uals participate in VR as well as their likelihood of employment. Marital status and the
presence of children likely also affect participation in VR as well as employment out-
comes (Allingham and Hyatt 1995; Aakvik et al. 2005). On average, we expect individ-
uals with higher levels of education to have higher opportunity costs associated with
remaining on CPPD due to more favorable labor market opportunities as well as lower
psychic costs of participation (e.g., Allingham and Hyatt 1995).
An individual’s health problem is also an important control variable in the propensity
score model for VR participation. Different health problems imply varying degrees of
physical and mental limitations, which we would expect to affect the degree to which
individuals take up VR (Aakvik 2001), their probability of employment (Currie and
Madrian 1999) and the type of work they do (and thus their earnings) conditional on
employment (Daly and Bound 1996; Campolieti 2009).
Other conditioning variables include the earnings before an individual began collect-
ing disability benefits and the duration of their CPPD spell as of the start of our data.
We expect both prior earnings and time on disability to proxy for otherwise unob-
served variables such as motivation, determination or attractiveness. For example, if
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ditioning on earlier labor market outcomes should help to remove selection bias that
results from motivation or determination playing a role in receipt of VR. Indeed, the lit-
erature suggests that prior outcomes often play a critical role in the plausibility of a “se-
lection on observed variables” identification strategy. For this reason, we condition
flexibly on pre-program earnings. In particular, we use a cubic polynomial of earnings
1-year prior to applying for CPPD benefits, a cubic polynomial of earnings 2-years prior
to applying for CPPD benefits, interactions between earnings 1- and 2-years prior to
applying for CPPD benefits as well as indicators for zero earnings 1- and 2-years prior
to applying for CPPD benefits. This sort of conditioning set is in the spirit of what has
been done in the literature evaluating the Workforce Investment Act using similar
methods by, e.g., Heinrich et al. (2013) and Andersson et al. (2013). Aakvik et al. (2005)
also include some pre-program variables in the conditioning set in their analysis of the
Norwegian VR program as do Dean et al. (2013a, b) in their study of VR in Virginia.
Dolton and Smith (2011) study the New Deal for Lone Parents program in the U.K.
and find that the durations of the social assistance spells of the program participants
and non-participants contain a great deal of information on variables that would
otherwise be unobserved. In our study, spell duration on the CPPD (i.e., the length of
time the person has received disability benefits as of the start of our data) proxies for
the severity of the disability, which we do not observe in our data. Severity has been
found to be an important factor affecting the employment of persons with disabilities
(Meyer and Mok 2013) as well as the uptake of VR (Allingham and Hyatt 1995). In
addition, CPPD spell duration can also proxy for the extent of depreciation in the
claimant’s human capital stock, which we do not otherwise observe in our data, and
which we also expect to have an effect on labor market outcomes and participation in
VR (Grossman 1972; Campolieti and Hyatt 2011).
Finally, the provincial unemployment rate captures the economic conditions facing
CPPD recipients seeking to return to work. We measure the unemployment rate at the
time the individual enrolled in the VR program in the treatment group and the time
the individual was flagged for reassessment in the comparison group. The literature on
active labor market programs emphasizes the importance of including a measure of
local labor market conditions in the propensity score (e.g., Heckman et al. 1997).
We estimate the conditional probability of participation, i.e., the propensity score,
with a logit functional form. Generally, the literature has found that matching estimates
are not sensitive to the choice of a logit or probit functional form. However, Dolton
and Smith (2011), like many other researchers, find that allowing for some flexibility in
how the conditioning variables enter the propensity score can be quite important. Con-
sequently, we enter some of variables in our model as cubic polynomials (age at onset
of the disability, earnings 1- and 2-years before application, CPPD spell duration and
unemployment rates) and also include some interaction terms (an interaction between
1-year and 2-years before application earnings).
Another issue of concern with matching and reweighting estimators of treatment ef-
fects is the degree of overlap in the distribution of the propensity score. The literature
offers a variety of different ways to measure the region of common support and to im-
pose a common support condition on the analysis. Crump et al. (2009) show that trim-










Figure 1 Histogram of propensity score for comparison and treatment groups, men.
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over, values of the propensity score near zero or one can lead to instability in the esti-
mates as well as poor finite sample performance of the IPW estimator (Busso et al.
2013). We present plots of the propensity score by treatment and comparison group
for men and women in Figures 1 and 2. These figures provide reason for concern about
the degree of overlap in the upper tails of the estimated propensity score distribution









Figure 2 Histogram of propensity score for comparison and treatment groups, women.
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mated propensity scores. Our preferred estimates for men restrict the propensity score
to lie in [0.001, 0.40], while for women they restrict the propensity score to lie in
[0.001, 0.35]. As a sensitivity analysis, we also consider estimates with less aggressive
trimming, so that the propensity scores lie in [0.001, 0.50] for men and [0.001, 0.40] for
women, and more aggressive trimming, so that the propensity scores lie in [0.001, 0.35]
for men and [0.001, 0.30] for women.
4.3 Program framework
We now present some details on the selection of individuals into the program in order
to provide context for the estimates and to help justify the “selection on observed vari-
ables” assumption underlying the estimators we use. A recent survey of case managers
indicated that many of the individuals in the CPPD-VR program contacted SDC and
enrolled themselves (Social Development Canada 2004). Other individuals in the VR
program may have enrolled in the program after being referred to the program during
a reassessment of their case by CPPD personnel. Quite importantly, the CPPD program
differs from some workers’ compensation programs, which can compel an individual to
enroll in a VR program, because enrollment in the program is voluntary. The CPPD-
VR program’s requirements in terms of potential clients are that individuals are moti-
vated to return to work and that the client’s physician agrees that he or she can cope
with a work-related VR program. This suggests that while many individuals may desire
to enter the VR program, medical assessments will partly determine who enrolls in the
program and who does not. We think this helps with our selection problem by making
the VR participants look more like our comparison group members who get reassessed
because of the nature of their disability or their demonstrated ability to generate
earnings.
Between 1998 and 2003 the average annual expenditures of the CPPD-VR program
were about $4.2 million, so the overall size of the program is small relative to the total
expenditures of the CPPD program of several billion dollars (Subcommittee on the Sta-
tus of Persons with Disabilities 2004). Consequently, there are only a limited number of
spots in the CPPD-VR program. The program is not an entitlement, and the number of
available slots varies across geographic regions in ways not systematically related to
local economic conditions. Moreover, access may depend on caseworker approval;
CPPD recipients get assigned to caseworkers in ways unrelated to their likelihood of
employment. The allocation of VR services to CPPD recipients thus differs importantly
from the way in which Canada allocates training in its active labor market programs. In
those programs, opportunities for training do depend on local economic conditions, in
addition to caseworker approval. In our context, both the non-systematic assignment of
clients to caseworkers and the fact that the number of VR slots in a region do not de-
pend on local economic conditions generate useful (i.e. not correlated with the un-
treated outcome) variation in treatment status conditional on observed characteristics
and so increase the plausibility of our identification strategy.
These arrangements for the CPPD VR program resemble those in Norway, whose VR
program is studied by Aakvik (2001) and Aakvik et al. (2005). In Norway, participant
slots in general training programs are related to economic conditions, but not in the
disability insurance system’s VR program. The availability of VR opportunities in the
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rangements in Norway were key to the identification strategy used by Aakvik et al.
(2005), which relied on medical reasons determining the enrollment into the VR pro-
gram and the availability of opportunities in the VR program to be related to the cap-
acity of program in a region (and not the unemployment rate in that region).5. Empirical results
5.1 Characteristics of the sample and estimates of propensity score
Tables 2 and 3 provide the descriptive statistics for our data for males and females dis-
aggregated by treatment status. The mean age of participants in the VR program is
about seven years lower than those in the comparison group (mid-30s for the treatment
group and early-40s for the comparison group) for both males and females. For males
the proportions of the treatment and comparison groups that are married is almost
identical. However, for women only 51 percent of the treatment group is married, while






Age (at onset of disability) 35.726 7.094 43.986 9.409
Married 0.632 0.485 0.657 0.475
Have children 0.632 0.485 0.450 0.498
[Less than high school]
High school 0.663 0.475 0.206 0.405
Post-secondary 0.105 0.309 0.075 0.263
University degree 0.084 0.279 0.074 0.261
[Other]
Infectious and parasitic diseases 0.042 0.202 0.037 0.190
Cancer 0.032 0.176 0.076 0.265
Blood diseases 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mental disorders 0.116 0.322 0.258 0.438
Diseases of the nervous system 0.274 0.448 0.087 0.282
Circulatory diseases 0.084 0.279 0.155 0.362
Respiratory diseases 0.011 0.103 0.016 0.125
Diseases of digestive system 0.032 0.176 0.026 0.159
Genitourinary system diseases 0.011 0.103 0.033 0.178
Musculoskeletal and soft-tissue disorders 0.179 0.385 0.187 0.390
Congenital diseases 0.011 0.103 0.008 0.089
Zero earnings 1-year prior to application 0.347 0.479 0.293 0.455
Zero earnings 2-years prior to application 0.337 0.475 0.336 0.473
Average earnings 1-year prior to application (dollars) 10421.88 13710.64 16132.02 19302.91
Average earnings 2-years prior to application (dollars) 13089.77 15690.21 17829.55 20587.37
Provincial unemployment rate 8.058 1.802 8.316 2.699
Duration on CPPD (days) 1131.295 586.046 1149.897 617.988
Number of observations 95 884






Age (at onset of disability) 36.552 7.361 43.423 8.668
Married 0.507 0.504 0.618 0.486
Have children 0.522 0.503 0.410 0.492
[Less than high school]
High school 0.552 0.501 0.325 0.469
Post-secondary 0.164 0.373 0.143 0.350
University degree 0.149 0.359 0.097 0.296
[Other]
Infectious and parasitic diseases – – – –
Cancer 0.030 0.171 0.082 0.275
Blood diseases 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mental disorders 0.254 0.438 0.390 0.488
Diseases of the nervous system 0.045 0.208 0.107 0.309
Circulatory diseases 0.090 0.288 0.052 0.222
Respiratory diseases – – – –
Diseases of digestive system 0.090 0.288 0.017 0.131
Genitourinary system diseases 0.030 0.171 0.010 0.100
Musculoskeletal and soft-tissue disorders 0.299 0.461 0.263 0.441
Congenital diseases 0.015 0.122 0.013 0.113
Zero earnings 1-year prior to application 0.313 0.467 0.251 0.434
Zero earnings 2-years prior to application 0.254 0.438 0.228 0.420
Average earnings 1-year prior to application (dollars) 10796.25 13260.08 13778.91 15603.86
Average earnings 2-years prior to application (dollars) 13730.81 14902.95 16427.55 16576.09
Provincial unemployment rate 8.012 2.604 8.101 2.350
Duration on CPPD (days) 1242.254 587.261 1024.588 551.253
Number of observations 67 692
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both males and females.
The primary medical problems differ somewhat between the treatment and compari-
son groups as well as by gender. For example, in Table 2, males with diseases of the
nervous system comprise 26 percent of the treatment group, but nine percent of the
comparison group; mental disorders are 11 percent of the treatment group, but 25 per-
cent of the comparison group; and musculoskeletal and soft-tissue disorders are about
21 percent of both the treatment and comparison groups. In Table 3, the summary sta-
tistics for women indicate some different patterns: diseases of the nervous system are
four percent of the treatment group, but 10 percent of the comparison group; mental
disorders are 26 percent of the treatment group, but 38 percent of the comparison
group; and musculosketal and soft-tissue problems are 30 percent of the treatment
group and 27 percent of the comparison group.
The average earnings before entering the CPPD program are lower in the treatment
group than the comparison group. Moreover, the differences in average earnings
between the treatment and comparison groups are smaller for women. Regional
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groups. The average time on the CPPD program is also similar for men (1276 days for
the treatment group, and 1260 days in the comparison group) and somewhat similar
for women (1282 days for the treatment group and 1154 days for the comparison
group).
We present the standardized differences between the treatment and comparison
groups before and after matching in Tables 4 and 5. We present these estimates based
on the IPW and the genetic matching algorithm for both men and women. Lee (2013)
notes that there is no consensus on how to best show balance and that there are a
number of ways to test for balance. However, standardized differences are straight-
forward to implement and relatively standard in the literature, so we use them. Not
surprisingly, the genetic matching algorithm tends to improve covariate balance relative
to IPW for many of the observed covariates.
Table 6 presents coefficient estimates from the propensity score models for males
and females. For males, higher levels of educational attainment are associated with in-
creases in the probability of participating in the CPPD-VR program. A few of the con-
trols for health problems are associated with decreases in the probability of











Age −67.9 12.7 −61.2 1.8
High school 66.3 0.7 35.7 4.1
College 13.6 3.8 5.5 −4.8
University 3.3 −6.9 13.7 −1.1
Married −4.6 6.1 −8.1 −7.8
Have children 6.7 −4.6 20.8 3.5
Infectious and parasitic diseases 8.1 −1.6 – –
Cancer 8.2 −2.5 −14.0 −1.8
Mental disorders −14.6 −0.7 −17.8 −6.8
Diseases of the nervous system 16.9 −2.5 −20.8 −2.0
Circulatory diseases −18.8 8.8 −1.9 −4.8
Respiratory diseases 0.0 −7.6 – –
Diseases of digestive system −5.3 −13.4 20.3 23.5
Genitourinary system diseases −9.3 −1.3 5.9 −6.0
Musculoskeletal and soft-tissue disorders −4.4 −1.5 14.2 6.2
Congenital diseases 9.5 14.1 4.7 2.9
Zero earnings 1-year prior to application 9.5 6.2 21.8 10.8
Zero earnings 2-years prior to application 11.6 21.6 14.5 2.4
Earnings 1-year prior to application −18.7 1.0 −9.5 −0.4
Earnings 2-years prior to application −22.7 −13.9 −3.6 5.8
Unemployment rate 0.2 −0.2 −19.0 −8.2
Duration on CPPD program −9.7 1.7 18.2 −2.2
Notes: Entries in the table are standardized differences between the treatment and comparison groups.










Age −67.9 3.0 −61.2 −9.8
High school 66.3 3.6 35.7 0.0
College 13.6 5.4 5.5 0.0
University 3.3 0.0 13.7 5.8
Married −4.6 7.4 −8.1 −4.1
Have children 6.7 0.0 20.8 −4.1
Infectious and parasitic diseases 8.1 0.0 – –
Cancer 8.2 0.0 −14.0 0.0
Mental disorders −14.6 0.0 −17.8 0.0
Diseases of the nervous system 16.9 0.0 −20.8 8.4
Circulatory diseases −18.8 0.0 −1.9 0.0
Respiratory diseases 0.0 0.0 – –
Diseases of digestive system −5.3 0.0 20.3 0.0
Genitourinary system diseases −9.3 0.0 5.9 0.0
Musculoskeletal and soft-tissue disorders −4.4 −4.9 14.2 −4.3
Congenital diseases 9.5 13.5 4.7 14.3
Zero earnings 1-year prior to application 9.5 −3.7 21.8 0.0
Zero earnings 2-years prior to application 11.6 −3.7 14.5 −13.1
Earnings 1-year prior to application −18.7 −9.3 −9.5 −5.1
Earnings 2-years prior to application −22.7 −5.8 −3.6 0.7
Unemployment rate 0.2 2.9 −19.0 −9.8
Duration on CPPD program −9.7 −4.4 18.2 −9.6
Notes: Entries in the table are standardized differences between the treatment and comparison groups.
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in the propensity score specification are not individually statistically significant, al-
though they are jointly significant. The estimates for women in Table 6 resemble those
for men. In particular, higher levels of educational attainment are associated with in-
creases in the probability of participating in the CPPD-VR program and some health
problems are associated with decreases in the probability of participating in the CPPD-
VR, relative to the omitted category. Also like the estimates for males, most of the vari-
ables in the propensity score model are not individually statistically significant but the
likelihood ratio test statistic for the model as a whole is quite large.
5.2 The average treatment effect on the treated for the CPPD-VR program
We present our estimates of the ATET for VR in Table 7 for men and Table 8 for
women. We consider three outcomes (leaving the disability rolls, employment and sub-
stantial gainful employment) and present estimates of the ATET based on propensity
score matching (kernel and local linear), inverse probability weighting and genetic
matching. As we noted earlier, we present estimates for three ranges of the propensity
score, with our preferred sample containing individuals with propensity scores that lie
in [0.001, 0.40] for men and [0.001, 0.35] for women.










Age (at onset of disability) 0.519 0.761 −2.667** 1.067
Age2 −0.009 0.021 0.076*** 0.030
Age3 0.000 0.000 −0.001*** 0.000
Married 0.413 0.351 −0.427 0.331
Have children 0.334 0.321 0.188 0.339
[Less than high school]
High school 2.673*** 0.354 1.766*** 0.428
Post-secondary 1.592*** 0.492 1.311*** 0.529
University degree 2.203*** 0.544 2.169*** 0.590
[Other]
Infectious and parasitic diseases −0.885 0.703 – –
Cancer −1.250* 0.729 −1.810** 0.877
Mental disorders −1.580*** 0.467 −1.613*** 0.518
Diseases of the nervous system 0.804* 0.423 −1.806** 0.768
Circulatory diseases 0.021 0.548 0.175 0.702
Respiratory diseases 0.530 1.409 – –
Diseases of digestive system 0.480 0.785 0.992 0.787
Genitourinary system diseases −1.396 1.129 −0.071 1.046
Musculoskeletal and soft-tissue diseases 0.036 0.447 −0.398 0.496
Congenital diseases −0.158 1.391 −0.509 1.217
Zero earnings 1-year prior to application 0.365 0.451 −0.097 0.524
Zero earnings 2-years prior to application −0.273 0.505 −0.529 0.609
Earnings 1-year prior to application (‘0,000 dollars) 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000
Earnings 1-year prior to pplication2 (‘000 dollars) 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000
Earnings 1-year prior to pplication3 (‘000 dollars) 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000
Earnings 2-years prior to application (‘000 dollars) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Earnings 2-years prior to application2
(‘000 dollars)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Earnings 2-years prior to application3
(‘000 dollars)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Earnings 1-year prior to application ×
Earnings 2-years prior to application
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Provincial unemployment rate −0.231 3.602 −1.398 1.502
Provincial unemployment rate2 0.095 0.418 0.119 0.145
Provincial unemployment rate3 −0.006 0.016 −0.003 0.004
Duration on CPPD Program (‘000 days) −0.003 0.003 −0.003 0.003
Duration on CPPD Program2 (‘000 days) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Duration on CPPD Program3 (‘000 days) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Likelihood ratio test statistic 227.4 {<0.001} 163.9 {<0.001}
Value of log likelihood −198.15 −179.51
Sample size 979 759
Notes: ***denotes statistically significance at the 1 percent level. **denotes statistically significance at the 5 percent level.
*denotes statistically significance at the 10 percent level. Square braces contain omitted reference category for dummy
variables. Braces contain p-value for likelihood ratio test statistics.
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Sample restricted to propensity score values [0.001, 0.40]
Leaving disability rolls
0.057 0.073 0.039 −0.036
(0.082) (0.113) (0.076) (0.096)
Gainful employment
0.062 0.070 0.030 −0.073
(0.080) (0.099) (0.077) (0.096)
Substantial gainful employment
0.025 0.035 0.001 −0.055
(0.078) (0.097) (0.074) (0.098)
Sample size 786 786 786 786
Sample restricted to propensity score values [0.001, 0.35]
Leaving disability rolls
0.014 0.015 0.003 −0.067
(0.083) (0.082) (0.084) (0.111)
Gainful employment
0.022 0.025 0.007 0.000
(0.081) (0.079) (0.083) (0.109)
Substantial gainful employment
0.009 0.026 0.013 −0.022
(0.083) (0.078) (0.083) (0.111)
Sample size 774 774 774 774
Sample restricted to propensity score values [0.001, 0.50]
Leaving disability rolls
0.033 0.044 0.018 0.000
(0.082) (0.085) (0.072) (0.101)
Gainful employment
0.024 0.027 −0.008 −0.017
(0.081) (0.088) (0.073) (0.097)
Substantial gainful employment
−0.008 −0.005 −0.033 −0.049
(0.078) (0.085) (0.073) (0.100)
Sample size 805 805 805 805
Notes: ATET denotes average treatment effect on the treated. Observations with propensity score values outside the range in
square brackets are omitted from the sample used to estimate the ATET. Standard errors in parentheses. The kernel and local
linear matching estimates were obtained with the Epanechnikov kernel, with bandwidths computed using cross-validation;
see Table 1 for the bandwidths. Genetic matching estimates are based on single nearest neighbor matching with replacement.
Standard errors for kernel and local linear matching and inverse probability weighting are obtained by bootstrapping with 1000
replications. Standard errors for genetic matching are based on Abadie and Imbens (2006).
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outcomes we consider. Putting aside the genetic matching estimates for the moment,
the other estimators suggest impacts on leaving the disability rolls and on gainful employ-
ment of about five or six percentage points. They indicate a smaller impact on substantial
gainful employment of about two percentage points. None of these estimates differ statis-
tically from zero, though of course the point estimates remain the preferred estimates.
Mucking around with the common support does little to change the story.
The estimates for women in Table 8 differ from those for men: they are larger in
magnitude and more often attain conventional levels of statistical significance. Looking
across estimators, the estimates of the ATET for the leaving the disability rolls and
gainful employment outcomes average a bit over ten percentage points, while the sub-
stantial gainful employment ATETs average around 16 percentage points. The former
estimates do not attain statistical significance, while the latter do, sometimes at the five







Sample restricted to propensity score values [0.001, 0.35]
Leaving disability rolls 0.104 0.104 0.095 0.122
(0.086) (0.084) (0.080) (0.111)
Gainful employment 0.110 0.109 0.108 0.143
(0.082) (0.081) (0.078) (0.104)
Substantial gainful employment 0.169** 0.158** 0.144* 0.184*
(0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.103)
Sample size 631 631 631 631
Sample restricted to propensity score values [0.001, 0.30]
Leaving disability rolls 0.105 0.085 0.096 0.071
(0.088) (0.088) (0.087) (0.120)
Gainful employment 0.133 0.120 0.130 0.143
(0.087) (0.087) (0.084) (0.122)
Substantial gainful employment 0.180** 0.156* 0.159* 0.167
(0.083) (0.085) (0.084) (0.118)
Sample size 615 615 615 615
Sample restricted to propensity score values [0.001,0.40]
Leaving disability rolls 0.109 0.093 0.093 0.077
(0.086) (0.081) (0.078) (0.105)
Gainful employment 0.147 0.137 0.138 0.154
(0.085) (0.076) (0.074) (0.099)
Substantial gainful employment 0.195** 0.175** 0.171** 0.192**
(0.081) (0.075) (0.074) (0.098)
Sample size 642 642 642 642
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
See notes for Table 7.
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support region does not change the overall picture.
Looking across estimators in Tables 7 and 8, the genetic matching estimates end up
outliers in both cases: on the high side for women and on the low side for men. The
genetic matching estimates have the feature that they optimize balance and the feature
that they build on a single nearest neighbor matching estimator that does not use as
much of the information available in the comparison group as the other three estima-
tors. For this reason, we tend to discount the estimates from the genetic matching esti-
mator relative to the other three.
Substantively, the estimates reveal a large difference in impacts between men and
women and, not unrelated, estimates for women large enough to cast doubt on the val-
idity of our identification strategy. The estimates for women seem a bit large relative to
a casual prior based on the nature of the treatment and of the participants’ underlying
conditions. To address our concerns about the magnitude of some of the estimates,
and because we think it represents good empirical practice more generally, we turn
now to an analysis of the sensitivity of our estimates to lingering selection on unob-
served variables not accounted for by our choice of comparison group and our
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context of the literature.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis and comparison with previous and related research
This section presents the results of a sensitivity analysis using the approach in Ichino
et al. (2008). Their approach builds on earlier work by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
and Rosenbaum (1987), who consider the robustness of estimates of the ATET to as-
sumptions with respect to a binary unobserved variable associated with both the treat-
ment and outcome variables. Within the sensitivity analysis, the CIA holds when the
variable is included and fails to hold when it is not included. Consequently, estimating
the ATET including and excluding this variable from the conditioning set determines
the sensitivity of the estimates of the ATET to the unobserved variable. Ichino et al.
(2008) build on this framework and extend it so they can provide point estimates of the
ATET under different assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved variable,
rather than bounds as in the earlier literature.
We present the estimates from the sensitivity analysis in Tables 9 and 10. These ta-
bles present the estimates of the ATET by outcome measure. We present these esti-
mates for various assumptions about the unobserved variable or confounder, denoted
U. Each panel of estimates includes an estimate for the case with “no confounder”,
which means that the CIA holds and that no relevant variable has been excluded from
the conditioning set and a “neutral confounder”, which has a distribution that is cali-
brated so that it has no net effect on the untreated outcome and no effect on selection
into treatment and so functions as a sort of placebo test. We also selected a few vari-
ables to simulate as confounders, which are listed in the rows of the tables. Unfortu-
nately, the methodology we use restricts us to using discrete variables for the sensitivity
analysis. We present estimates of the ATET as well as the quantities referred to as the
“outcome” and “selection” effects in Ichino et al. (2008). The outcome and selection ef-
fects are odds ratios from logit models that estimate P(Y = 1 | T = 0, X, U) and P(T = 1 |
X, U), where U is the confounder and the other variables are as previously defined. The
outcome effect measures the effect of U on the untreated outcome controlling for
observed covariates. The selection effect measures the effect of U on assignment to
treatment controlling for observed covariates. The outcome and selection effects are
used in the sensitivity analysis to benchmark how strong the confounder needs to be to
change the substantive importance of the ATET or its statistical significance. The
estimates we examine for the sensitivity analysis are the kernel matching estimates3.
The sensitivity analysis for men in Table 9 indicates that the estimates of the ATET
with the simulated confounders are the same as those with no unobserved confound-
ing, but the precision of the estimates varies somewhat with the confounders. As with
our estimates in Table 7, none of the estimates of the ATET are statistically significant.
For women, we also see very robust findings, i.e., there is not a great deal of sensitivity
of our estimates to the simulated confounder. For women, the ATET do not vary by
the confounders we consider, but the precision of the estimates is affected somewhat
for some confounders4. As we noted earlier, we are restricted to using binary variables
in our sensitivity analysis. One explanation for our finding of no sensitivity is that the
variables we selected are not strongly correlated with both treatment choice and out-
comes. We feel that some of the continuous variables in our conditioning set, such as
Table 9 Sensitivity analysis, calibrated confounders for kernel matching estimate of
ATET, men
Outcome effect Selection effect ATET SE
Leaving disability rolls
No confounder – – 0.065 0.073
Neutral confounder 1.008 1.051 0.065 0.071
Confounders
High school 1.703 3.508 0.065 0.081
College 3.194 2.213 0.065 0.090
University 1.566 1.325 0.065 0.083
Married 0.601 0.862 0.065 0.074
Mental disorders 0.750 0.812 0.065 0.084
Musculoskeletal disorders 0.660 0.972 0.065 0.081
Zero earnings 1-year prior to application 0.641 1.322 0.065 0.081
Zero earnings 2-years prior to application 0.713 1.515 0.065 0.074
Gainful employment
No confounder – – 0.074 0.081
Neutral confounder 1.011 1.028 0.074 0.084
Confounders
High school 1.981 3.640 0.074 0.071
College 2.990 2.175 0.074 0.083
University 1.247 1.278 0.074 0.072
Married 0.560 0.868 0.074 0.078
Mental disorders 0.862 0.805 0.074 0.082
Musculoskeletal disorders 0.599 0.994 0.074 0.083
Zero earnings 1-year prior to application 0.554 1.304 0.074 0.071
Zero earnings 2-years prior to application 0.647 1.509 0.074 0.077
Substantial gainful employment
No confounder – – 0.051 0.075
Neutral confounder 1.017 0.051 0.069
Confounders
High school 1.852 3.634 0.051 0.069
College 2.946 2.196 0.051 0.065
University 1.352 1.298 0.051 0.087
Married 0.569 0.872 0.051 0.062
Mental disorders 0.085 0.797 0.051 0.073
Musculoskeletal disorders 0.639 0.974 0.051 0.069
Zero earnings 1-year prior to application 0.510 1.300 0.051 0.087
Zero earnings 2-years prior to application 0.593 1.532 0.051 0.070
Notes: ATET denotes average treatment effect on the treated; SE denotes standard error. The outcome and selection
effects are odds ratios. The rows in the tables denote the confounding variable, the first two rows in each panel of
estimates show the ATET with no cofounding factor and with a neutral confounder. The kernel and local linear matching
estimates were obtained with the Epanechnikov kernel, with bandwidths computed using cross-validation. All standard
errors are obtained by bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
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dates for confounders since they are proxies for otherwise unobserved variables. Still,
we find a remarkable lack of sensitivity.
Table 10 Sensitivity analysis, calibrated confounders for kernel matching estimate of
ATET, women
Outcome effect Selection effect ATET SE
Leaving disability rolls
No confounder – – 0.103 0.068
Neutral confounder 1.018 1.034 0.103 0.078
Confounders
High school 1.295 2.235 0.103 0.067
College 1.464 1.219 0.103 0.078
University 1.358 1.703 0.103 0.077
Married 0.854 0.885 0.103 0.074
Mental disorders 1.045 0.727 0.103 0.069
Musculoskeletal disorders 0.652 1.433 0.103 0.088
Zero earnings 1-year prior to application 0.468 1.712 0.103 0.090
Zero earnings 2-years prior to application 1.064 1.496 0.103 0.082
Gainful employment
No confounder – – 0.141** 0.069
Neutral confounder 1.016 1.043 0.141 0.089
Confounders
High school 1.166 2.232 0.141** 0.069
College 1.624 1.198 0.141** 0.070
University 1.434 1.689 0.141** 0.068
Married 1.031 0.889 0.141** 0.063
Mental disorders 0.904 0.707 0.141** 0.07
Musculoskeletal disorders 0.569 1.456 0.141 0.088
Zero earnings 1-year prior to application 0.288 1.747 0.141* 0.080
Zero earnings 2-years prior to application 0.704 1.466 0.141** 0.070
Substantial gainful employment
No confounder – – 0.200*** 0.066
Neutral confounder 1.019 1.031 0.200** 0.079
Confounders
High school 1.176 2.202 0.200** 0.082
College 1.551 1.214 0.200** 0.077
University 1.592 1.678 0.200** 0.081
Married 0.961 0.899 0.200** 0.077
Mental disorders 0.998 0.716 0.200** 0.075
Musculoskeletal disorders 0.529 1.431 0.200*** 0.069
Zero earnings 1-year prior to application 0.241 1.703 0.200*** 0.066
Zero earnings 2-years prior to application 0.643 1.455 0.200** 0.079
Notes: See the notes to Table 9.
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ability rolls or finding employment for women. Our findings are not unlike the findings
from the literature examining active labor market programs that has generally found that
such programs have a larger effect on the labor market outcomes of women than those of
men (e.g., Heckman et al. 1999). However, the large difference in the size of the estimates
for men and women, as well as the absolute size of the estimated ATET for women, make
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employment outcomes of women after receiving VR. While we use a large and very
relevant set of conditioning variables motivated by theory, institutions and the prior
literature, in combination with a flexible functional form, some selection bias may
remain in our estimates. We would have liked to condition on a measure of the
severity of each individual’s disability, on some measure of ability (i.e. a test score),
on measures of non-cognitive skills, and so on. We think that using pre-disability
labor market outcomes captures much of what we would want from these variables,
but it may not go all the way. We also worry that duration on CPPD may not fully
capture the variation in human capital depreciation across individuals. Alternatively,
as we noted earlier, drawing our comparison group from the reassessment file may
not accomplish what we intend it to accomplish if individuals in the reassessment
file differ in, say, unobserved motivation to return to work.
Most of the previous literature looking at VR has examined programs with different
rehabilitation strategies as well as different client bases and many of these studies may
also be sensitive to specification errors or contaminated by other problems, as they
sometimes do not use very transparent identification strategies. However, our results
do have some parallels in some more recent empirical work studying VR programs with
more clearly defined identification strategies. For example, Aakvik et al. (2005) find an
(imprecisely estimated) increase in the employment of women in their study of the ef-
fects of the Norwegian VR program, though it is not as large as ours. Aakvik (2001)
also finds positive (but imprecisely estimated) effects of the Norwegian VR program on
employment for a pooled sample of men and women, with a point estimate of 6.3 per-
centage points, but interprets his estimates with caution due to lingering worries about
selection bias resulting from his bounding analysis. We also estimated the ATET using
an IPW estimator with a pooled sample of men and women and obtained estimates
similar to those in Aakvik (2001). More specifically, we obtained an ATET of 0.061 for
the gainful employment outcome and 0.052 for the substantial gainful employment out-
come, but these estimates did not statistically differ from zero.
Our estimates of the effect of VR are also quite interesting in comparison to esti-
mates from studies looking at financial and non-financial incentives to increase the at-
tachment of disability beneficiaries to the labor market. Campolieti and Riddell (2012)
found that the introduction of the CPPD earnings disregard (similar to the benefit off-
set in the SSDI program in the U.S.) increased the employment of disability beneficiar-
ies. Campolieti and Riddell’s preferred difference-in-difference estimates show that the
introduction of the earnings disregard and automatic reinstatement option increase the
employment of men by 5.1 percentage points and women by 9.5 percentage points,
relative to the Quebec Pension Plan Disability program. One concern about the intro-
duction of such incentives is the increased uptake of benefits, which is also referred to
as the induced entry effect (e.g. Hoynes and Moffitt 1999). However, Campolieti and
Riddell (2012) did not find any evidence of the increased receipt of disability benefits in
their analysis of flows onto the disability rolls. Kostøl and Mogstad (2013) looked at the
introduction of a benefit offset in Norway, which is very similar to the benefit offset
used in the SSDI program, exploiting a discontinuity created by the eligibility rules for
these new incentives, and found that there was a five to six percentage point increase
in employment after the introduction of the benefit offset. They also found that the
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SSDI benefits.
6. Cost savings to the CPPD program from the VR program
This section presents the results from a crude, back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit ana-
lysis from the narrow perspective of the CPPD program. Alternatively, a cost-benefit
analysis could be undertaken from the perspective of persons with disabilities, tax-
payers and society as a whole. Our analysis from the perspective of the CPPD program
reflects the net (of VR programs costs) savings in transfers from the program to per-
sons with disabilities associated with providing VR and not a welfare gain or loss to
society.
We measure the benefits of the VR program as the CPPD payments that the program
saves over the remainder of a claimants working life when they leave the disability rolls
combined with the additional (involuntary) contributions they make as a result of
working. The costs consist of the expenditures on VR for the treatment group. We
used a real discount rate of 3.9 percent in our base-case computations, which is the
mean of the interest rate on real return government of Canada bonds from 1997 to
2001. We conducted a sensitivity analysis with a lower bound discount rate of 1.9 per-
cent and an upper bound of 5.9 percent.
To keep things very simple, we choose a discounting horizon equal to the difference
between 65, the CPP regular retirement age when all disability benefits roll over into
retirement benefits, and 47, the average age at which individuals leave the disability
rolls in the comparison group; this difference equals 18 years. Our calculations impli-
citly assume that individuals who leave the disability rolls do not return at some later
point. This assumption likely makes our estimates an upper bound on the effects of the
VR program on CPPD transfers to individuals.
In order to incorporate the higher probability that individuals in the treatment group
leave the disability rolls, we compute







where ENB denotes expected net benefits, qleave is the probability of leaving the disability
rolls, B is benefit payments saved, C is the per capita cost of VR and r is the discount rate.
The corresponding formula for the comparison group simply omits the C. We computed
the qleave probabilities for the treatment group based on the IPW estimates of the ATET
(i.e., the proportion in the comparison group plus the ATET), while the proportion leav-
ing the CPPD program is used as the qleave probability for the comparison group. The
specific values that we plug into the formula along with additional details about the calcu-
lations appear in Table 11 and its associated table notes.
Table 12 presents the net expected benefits (per person) for the treatment and com-
parison groups. For the base case (a discount rate of 3.9 percent), our estimates indicate
that the net impact of the CPPD-VR program (the ENB for the treatment group less
the ENB for the comparison group) for women equals $4,538 per client. During the
1998–1999 fiscal year the mean annual CPPD benefit payment to an individual was
about $8,968, so our preferred estimate of the cost savings is about 0.5 years of the










Treatment Group 0.373 18 7,908 5,783
Comparison Group 0.278 18 8,994 0
Men
Treatment Group 0.412 18 7,567 6,376
Comparison Group 0.373 18 8,110 0
Notes: The probability of ceasing benefits is the mean for the comparison group; for the treatment group the probability
of ceasing benefits is computed as the mean for the comparison group plus the IPW estimate of the ATET in Tables 7
and 8 based on the sample that restricts the propensity score to [0.001, 0.40] for men and [0.001, 0.35] for women. The
discounting horizon is computed as the retirement age (65) minus the average age that benefits cease for the
comparison group (47). Payroll tax contributions to the CPP are based on the average pre-CPPD earnings multiplied by
0.099, which is the contribution rate since 2003.
Campolieti et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 26 of 292014, 3:10
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/10average benefit payment per VR client. The estimates are not overly sensitive to the dis-
count rate assumption, with the estimate increasing to $5,687 (0.63 years of mean ben-
efits) with a discount rate of 1.9 percent and falling to $3,637 (0.41 years of mean
benefits) with a discount rate of 5.9 percent.
In sharp contrast to the value obtained for women, the present value of the net benefits
of the CPPD-VR program for men turns out negative. For the base case discount rate it
equals about -$2,728, which indicates that the CPPD-VR program does not generate any
cost savings for men. The estimated savings (or lack thereof) associated with the CPPD-
VR program for men also do not vary very much with the assumed discount rate.
Our estimates indicate cost savings for the CPPD-VR program from serving women
but not from serving men. This suggests the potential value of targeting VR services
differentially toward female claimants, as well as the value of additional research de-
signed to account for the difference in impacts between men and women and to iden-
tify other subgroups defined by observed characteristics that experience differentially
larger impacts from the VR program.
7. Conclusion
This paper estimates the effect of the CPPD-VR program on the labor market out-
comes of disability beneficiaries. Our identification strategy rests on the selection of a
comparison group of reassessed claimants that we think reduces the amount of selec-




Net Impact of CPPD-VR −1296 4032
1.9% discount rate
Net Impact of CPPD-VR −1128 5094
5.9% discount rate
Net Impact of CPPD-VR −1519 3378
Notes: All entries are in dollars. The net impact is computed as the difference in the present value of the net benefits in
the treatment group minus the present value of the net benefits in the comparison group. The base discount rate of 3.9
percent is the average return on real return Canadian bonds between Jan. 1, 1997 and Dec. 31, 2001. Table 11 and the
notes to that table provide further details on inputs into the calculation.
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spell duration, pre-disability labor market outcomes and demographics. That variation
in the number of CPPD-VR slots does not depend on local economic conditions also
adds to the credibility of our analysis, as do the flexible specification we employ in our
propensity score model, our comparison of multiple matching and weighting estimators
and our additional analysis of the sensitivity of our estimates to the presence of unob-
served confounders. We argue that we have done about the best we can with the data
available to us and the institutions generating variation in treatment receipt.
Our estimates suggest that CPPD-VR improved the labor market outcomes of women
enough to pass a cost-benefit test from the perspective of the program. We cannot say
the same for the men. Though some of the estimates for women attain conventional levels
of statistical significance, overall our estimates lack the precision required to detect mod-
est but not trivial effects. These issues of precision follow directly from the sample sizes
available to us combined with our reliance on semi-parametric and non-parametric esti-
mation strategies. Our estimates comport with others in the literature in a broad sense,
but remain a bit too high for the women relative to our prior. Despite this, the estimates
for women (and for men) demonstrate very little sensitivity to unobserved confounders.
Finally, perhaps the most important lesson from our paper concerns the evidence it pro-
vides regarding the ability of researchers to perform really credible analyses of VR program
impacts. In our context, as in many others involving programs for persons with disabilities,
we lack the data and/or controlled variation in treatment status required to do a very com-
pelling analysis. We provided a list of variables we would have liked to condition on above.
Adding those variables to the administrative data would cost relatively little and would allow
many other interesting analyses as well. Alternatively, those who run the CPPD program,
and their peers who run similar programs elsewhere, could do more to introduce well-
defined mechanisms that vary treatment status, such as random assignment, or the use of
numerical readiness scores to assign treatment (thus allowing a discontinuity design) or ran-
domizing the roll-out of new programs across program offices and so on. In the absence of
additional data and/or better variation, policymakers and researches must settle for making
an evidentiary meal with whatever stray morsels the data and variation cupboard contains,
as we ourselves have done in this paper. Perhaps persons with disabilities deserve better?
Endnotes
1These income thresholds are determined by the CPP disability program and were
$8,937 in 1998, $9,020 in 1999, $9,155 in 2000 and $9,300 in 2001.
2In Canada, labor market earnings are reported on the T4 tax form, which we have
access to in the ROEMF. The T4 form in Canada is like the W2 form in the U.S.
3The sensitivity analysis uses the ado file created by Nannicini (2007) and thus the
kernel matching estimator in the propensity score matching software developed by
Becker and Ichino (2002). We modified their ado file so that it would use the band-
width we selected via cross-validation and the Epanechnikov kernel rather than the de-
fault choices the program otherwise imposes. The Becker and Ichino (2002) kernel
matching estimator is not coded in the same manner as its counterpart in the psmatch2
ado file we use to obtain the results presented in Tables 7 and 8. As a result, there are
some minor differences between the ATET estimates from the main analysis and the
baseline estimates in the sensitivity analysis.
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and found similar findings to those we report in the tables.
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